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Abstract
I examine long-term employment and wage consequences for refugees who migrate
to the United States under poor business cycle conditions. It is difficult to credibly
estimate the relationship between initial economic conditions and subsequent labor
outcomes for immigrants as most can choose when to migrate. However, estimation is
possible for refugees because their arrival dates are exogenously determined through
the US Refugee Resettlement Program. For every one percentage point increase in the
national unemployment rate at arrival, refugees experience a 3.45% reduction in wages
after five years and a 3.65 percentage point reduction in employment after four years.
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1 Introduction
The timing of labor market entry matters. Several studies (Oyer 2006; Oyer 2008; Kahn
2010; Oreopoulus, von Wachter, and Heisz 2012) have shown that poor initial economic
conditions faced by college graduates and post-graduates can be detrimental for long-term
employment and wage outcomes. This phenomenon, known as “scarring,” is an important
area of research in labor economics because it provides context regarding the significance of
early career decisions, job mobility, and human capital investment. In this study, I provide
evidence that this phenomenon is also observed among refugees who migrate to the United
States. This finding contributes both to existing scarring literature but also to migration
literature. Migration economists have long looked at whether immigrant earnings differ from
those of natives, why they differ, and how that gap changes over time (Chiswick 1978; Borjas
1985; LaLonde and Tobel 1992; Friedberg 1992; Borjas 1995; Hu 2000; Card 2005; Lubotsky
2007; Lubotsky 2011; Kim 2012; Abramitzky, Boustan and Eriksson 2014). Evidence of
employment and wage scarring among immigrant groups like refugees, and how those effects
compare with natives, helps to further explain the mechanisms that lead to wage differen-
tials, ceteris paribus.
It is difficult to credibly estimate the impact of initial economic conditions on long-term
assimilation outcomes for most immigrants as some may choose not to migrate to the US
if economic conditions are not favorable. However, refugees do not have this choice. They
are unable to stay in their country of origin due to political persecution, conflict, famine or
general lack of security. But they also can not immediately migrate to the US as the US
Refugee Resettlement program requires extensive background checks and screening that last
18-24 months before arrival. Additionally, refugees can not choose their initial resettlement
location unless they have family in the US. These institutional features provide exogenous
variation that make it possible to estimate how initial business cycle conditions affect assim-
ilation outcomes over the long term.
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Another important feature of this study is the use of a comprehensive, government-administered
household survey called the Annual Survey of Refugees. To my knowledge, no other US-
based refugee dataset tracks refugees for more than ninety days post-arrival. Researchers
who study long-term assimilation outcomes for refugees have instead relied on imputation
methods using the US Census (Capps, et. al. 2015; Evans and Fitzgerald 2017). These im-
putation methods likely suffer from contamination as some individuals imputed as refugees
may not actually be refugees. The data used in this study, which have appeared only in a
limited capacity in previous research (Beaman 2012; Arafah 2016), track refugees for five
years and thus provide a breakthrough opportunity for research into long-term assimilation
outcomes for refugees that resettle in the US.
Applying a fixed-effect model where the national unemployment rate at the time of arrival
is interacted with potential experience, I find that for every one percentage point increase in
the national unemployment rate at arrival, refugees on average experience a 3.45% reduction
in wages five years later and a 3.65 percentage point reduction in employment four years
later. In a separate regression, I substitute the arrival national unemployment rate with the
arrival placement-state unemployment rate. These estimates are used understand how mo-
bility across regions might mitigate scarring effects. Poor economic conditions in their state
of placement could cause some refugees to move to states with more favorable economic
conditions. I observe that for every one percentage point increase in the state of initial
placement unemployment rate at arrival refugees on average experience a 1.36% reduction
in wages up to three years later but observe no evidence of a reduction in employment. The
wage results found using state unemployment rates are also less persistent than those found
using the national unemployment rate.
Previous work on immigrant wage and employment scarring have looked at both immigrants
in the US and refugees in Scandinavia. Chiswick, Cohen and Zach (1997) examine immi-
grant employment outcomes in the US and find no evidence of a long-term scarring effect.
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Chiswick and Miller (2002) find some some evidence of wage scarring for immigrants in the
US. However, these studies do not account for the fact that many immigrants may choose to
migrate based on economic conditions. Given this concern for selective migration, A˚slund
and Rooth (2007) instead use refugees in Sweden to measure this effect. Similar to the US
context, refugees in Sweden in the early 1990s were exogenously placed in a varied geo-
graphic settings at different points of time. They find that poor initial economic conditions
can decrease wages for refugees for up 10 years after migration. Godøy (2017) also examines
refugees in Norway and finds no evidence of a long-lasting wage scarring effect.
In this study, I examine employment and wage scarring effects for refugees who migrate to
the US. There are several reasons why the US setting provides a valuable contribution. The
US admits roughly half of the refugees that resettle to a third country. Refugee arrivals to
the US range between 50,000 to 200,000 per year, whereas only a few thousand migrate to
Scandinavian countries each year1. The US also has more geographic variation and ethnic
diversity, which could make the employment choice set larger for refugees. The US Refugee
Resettlement program, unlike resettlement programs in some countries, has also enjoyed rel-
ative stability since its inception in 1980. For example, in Sweden, as noted by A˚slund and
Rooth (2007), the formal refugee resettlement program was suspended in the early 1990s as
resources were diverted to accommodate an influx of asylum-seekers at their border. The
long-term stability of the US refugee resettlement program allows for examination of the
program over multiple business cycles. Finally, it is likely that estimates found in other
countries may not be applicable for the US setting. For example, refugees in Sweden are
encouraged to defer entry into the labor market for 18 months post-arrival (Ibid.). In the
US, refugees are encouraged to find work as soon as possible2.
This study also contributes to literature that examines heterogeneity of scarring effects within
the population. Hoynes, Miller and Schaller (2012) show that the impacts on labor market
1https://www.unhcr.org/statistical-yearbooks.html
2https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/receptionplacement/
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outcomes from changes in business cycle conditions can differ greatly across gender, race,
age and education. Differences have been found to arise within education groups based on
field of study (Altonji, Kahn and Speer 2014) and across male workers with different years of
education (Speer 2016). Schwandt and von Wachter (2018) find larger effects for non-whites
and high school dropouts. In a separate analysis, I divide my sample across gender and
educational attainment in country of origin. One key advantage to this study is that edu-
cational attainment is not endogenous to US economic conditions as refugees obtain these
degrees prior to arrival. I observe more persistent decreases in employment for non-high-
school-educated and high-school-educated males than for college-educated males. I also ob-
serve less persistence in wage scarring for college-educated males than non-college-educated
males. However, for women, I observe more persistence and larger magnitude decreases in
employment for those that are college-educated than those in less educated groups.
Finally, this study contributes to literature related to refugee labor supply shocks. This
literature is based primarily on the Mariel Boatlift, a mass emigration event of Cubans to
the US between April and October 1980. Exploiting the exogenous timing of these arrivals,
economists have used this event to explore whether or not immigration hurts native wages
and labor supply (Card 1990; Bodvarsson, Van der Berg and Lewer 2008; Peri and Yasenov
2015; Borjas 2017; Borjas and Monras 2017; Clemens and Hunt 2017). However, relatively
little is known about how changes in native labor supply could affect immigrant groups
like refugees. By focusing on labor outcomes for refugees, this study helps provide a better
understanding how natives and refugees may compete with one another. For example, in
comparison to studies that examine scarring for natives, notably Kahn (2010) which finds
an increase in labor supply after five years in response to poorer initial national economic
conditions, I find that refugees instead decrease their labor supply.
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2 Refugee Resettlement Program
In most circumstances individuals or families seeking to resettle in the US as refugees must
first go through the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). The UNHCR
determines the need for permanent resettlement through seven criteria: “legal and/or phys-
ical protection needs, survivors of torture and/or violence, medical needs, women and girls
at risk, family reunification, children and adolescents at risk and lack of foreseeable alter-
native duration solutions”3. The UNHCR makes a determination of where to send these
individuals based on country refugee acceptance quotas, family presence and cultural affini-
ties. If the individual or family is referred by the UNHCR to resettle in the United States,
they must undergo a screening process through the US Department of Homeland Security.
This screening process involves multiple interviews, submission of biometric information and
background checks. On average, applicants must wait 18 to 24 months before being granted
admission to the United States.
The State Department partners with nine non-profit voluntary resettlement agencies (VOLAGs)
to determine placement once a refugee or family has been granted admission to the US. These
organizations have 315 affiliates in 180 communities throughout the US. In Figure 1, each
affiliate’s office is mapped by its corresponding VOLAG. The State Department meets with
these organizations weekly to review information on incoming refugees and assign them to
a particular organization4. If an individual or family has family currently living in the US,
every effort is made to resettle them with or near their family. Otherwise, a resettlement
agency agrees to sponsor an individual or family based on available resources 5.
The nine VOLAGs are responsible for providing reception services for refugees during the
first ninety days of arrival, including providing safe and affordable housing, furnishings,
and services to acclimate them to their new environment. After ninety days, the Office
3http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/information-on-unhcr-resettlement.html
4https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31269.pdf
5https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/asked-refugees-referred-live-u-s
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of Refugee Resettlement works with individual states and non-govermental organizations
(NGOs) to provide longer-term services like medical assistance and social welfare benefits.
Refugees are allowed freedom of movement, so they are not bound to stay in the state they
were initially resettled. However, their financial assistance may in jeopardy if they move to
a state that does not offer the same benefits as their initial state of resettlement6.
There are exceptions to this resettlement process. Some individuals who eventually resettle
in the United States as refugees are referred through a US embassy or a human rights group.
Nevertheless, these individuals must still undergo the same screening process as refugees
referred by UNHCR. There are also individuals who request asylum at the US border, or
cross the border through illegal means and request asylum afterward. The asylum process
is significantly different than the formal refugee resettlement process. These individuals
must undergo court proceedings to gain asylum and are not afforded the same benefits and
support. For the purposes of this study, the term “refugee” will refer to individuals who
undergo the formalized refugee resettlement process. This distinction is important because
my identification strategy will rely on the fact that refugees who undergo this formalized
process cannot choose when or where they migrate within the United States.
3 Theory on Employment and Wage Scarring
The term “scarring” was first coined by David Ellwood (1982) to describe long-term nega-
tive consequences of entering the job market in a bad economy that persist well beyond the
transitory period. This phenomenon has been observed primarily with college graduates.
Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2012) and Kahn (2010) find large and persistent nega-
tive wage effects lasting 10 and 20 years for college graduates, respectively. It has also been
observed with individuals re-entering the job market after displacement. Ruhm (1991) finds
that such displaced workers experience a 10-13% drop in wages less than five years after
6https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/receptionplacement/
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displacement.
One potential theoretical explanation for this phenomenon is labor market friction. If em-
ployment and wages are determined by labor market conditions in a spot labor market,
where wages are determined by current supply and demand, then we would expect to not
observe any differences between similar individuals who enter the economy during different
business cycle conditions once economic conditions are similar. This is because productivity
between these individuals should not differ apart from slight experience disparities. If the
relationship between current employment and wages is influenced by labor market condi-
tions in a contract model, where future wages are pre-determined based on agreements with
employers made in prior periods, then persistence of depressed wages and employment could
be explained by mobility. An individual that cannot easily move between firms once labor
market conditions improve could see persistent effects. Beaudry and Dinardo (1991) examine
how wages are affected by market conditions and find that a contract model with costless
mobility fits this relationship better than a traditional spot labor market.
Another potential explanation is human capital accumulation. If an individual enters the
job market when opportunities are scarce, they might be forced to spend more time in a bad
match. As noted in Kahn (2010), if human capital accumulation is important, particularly
in the first few years of an individual’s career, then an individual’s inability to switch jobs
and find a better match could yield persistent, long-term detrimental outcomes. As the labor
market improves, individuals are able to switch jobs and gain human capital but they would
have lost the opportunity in earlier years. Therefore, controlling for experience, there would
be a disparity in human capital between individuals who entered the labor market under
difference economic conditions.
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4 Data
The data set I use in my analysis is the Annual Survey of Refugees. This survey was started
in 1975 as a way for refugee resettlement groups to assess assimilation outcomes for Asian
refugees, particularly those from Vietnam. In 1980, with the passage of the Refugee Act,
the survey became an important tool for the newly-created Office of Refugee Resettlement
(ORR) in the production of an annual report to Congress on refugee outcomes as required
by the new law. In 1993, the survey was expanded to include all refugee groups7. I use the
1993 through 2004 versions of these data to conduct my analysis. These data were previously
used in Beaman (2012) to provide intuition on the magnitude of her results derived from
another data set. More recent versions of the Annual Survey of Refugees data were provided
by ORR through Freedom of Information Act requests (Arafah 2016), but do not contain
information on the initial state of resettlement or country of origin for individuals in the
data.
The survey in its current form is a five-year rolling panel, whereby 1000-2000 refugee house-
holds are contacted in their initial year of resettlement and followed for a period of five years.
Each year an additional cohort is added and the cohort entering its sixth year is dropped.
The survey is broken down into two parts: an individual family member portion that is
given to all individuals in the household that are over the age of 16, and a household level
portion. The individual portion asks basic demographic information including gender, age,
years of education prior to arrival, degree attainment prior to arrival, disability, fluency in
English upon arrival, marital status, parental status, family size, country of birth, month
and year of entry, and original state of resettlement. The remainder of the individual survey
includes questions about current employment and hourly wages8. The household portion
of the survey includes questions on utilization of means-tested welfare programs like the
7https://archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/data/04arc8.htm8
8The survey is conducted over a period of several years. In my analysis wages are inflation-adjusted to
constant 2000 US dollars to allow for comparison across years.
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Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families program (TANF)9, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and General Assistance
(GA).
In order to create a sample that is best suited for my analysis, I limit to individuals who
go through the formalized refugee resettlement process. The Office of Refugee Resettlement
is responsible for both Cuban and Haitian asylees as well as refugees10. The data do not
distinguish whether Cubans and Haitians in the data are asylees or refugees, so I drop these
individuals. I also drop individuals that did not arrive to the US during the target period of
zero to five years prior to being surveyed. Since the survey participants are determined on a
household basis instead of an individual basis, some individuals appear in the data that did
not arrive during the target period. Finally, I limit the sample to individuals between the
ages of 16 to 65 in order to analyze individuals of working age in the US. The final sample
used in my analysis contains 39,026 observations of 18,710 individuals11 who resettled in the
US between May 1988 and May 2004.
Table 1 contains summary statistics of the sample broken down by intervals of year of arrival.
As expected, the composition of refugees by region of origin changes over time. In the late-
1980s and early-1990s, a large portion of refugees resettled in the US came from Asia. In the
mid-1990s, following the breakup of Yugoslavia, the majority of refugees came from Europe.
In the early-2000s, the composition of origin-regions is fairly evenly split between Africa,
Asia and Europe. Despite big differences in origin-region composition, the composition of
refugees by demographic characteristics appears fairly consistent. The most noticeable dif-
ference is that refugees in the early-2000s are much more fluent in English than in previous
9The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program replaced the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program following the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Op-
portunity Reconciliation (PRWORA) Act in 1996. The data make no distinction between the two programs.
10https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/who-we-serve-cuban-haitian-entrants
11The original individual indicator variable in the data (f1id) has inconsistencies in terms of gender,
country of origin and date of birth. This is likely because numbers are recycled after an individual’s five
year survey period ends. I construct a new individual indicator variable that groups individual records by
the dataset’s original indicator variable and fixed demographic characteristics to account for this problem.
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years. There is also a decrease over time in the percentage of refugees who are married
when they arrive. Empirical tests outlined in Section 7.3 suggest that these differences don’t
correlate much with the timing of arrival once I control for country of origin.
5 Empirical Strategy
My empirical strategy is based on two plausibly exogenous features of the refugee resettle-
ment program: month and year of arrival and, for refugees who don’t already have family
living in the US, initial state of placement. I use seasonally-adjusted civilian unemployment
rates for both the nation and placement-state as measures of initial economic conditions.
The national unemployment rate at date of arrival is used to measure the general effect that
initial economic conditions may have on long-term assimilation outcomes. The placement-
state unemployment rate is used to introduce a mobility element into the analysis. If a
refugee migrates to the US during a recession, moving to a different state will not change
their exposure to national labor market conditions. However, if a refugee is placed in a state
with poorer economic conditions than neighboring states, they could move and potentially
experience better long-term labor outcomes than they would otherwise. Wozniak (2010)
finds that for highly educated workers, economic improvement in a particular state can have
large effects on whether the worker decides to relocate there. Given that refugees may not
have particularly strong ties to the state they were initially resettled, it could be the case
that they are also motivated to move in order to find better opportunities.12
Borrowing from Kahn (2010) and Godøy (2017)13, I rely on an interaction between unem-
ployment rate at arrival and years since migration to measure how initial economic conditions
12Unfortunately, the Annual Survey of Refugees data do not offer a credible way to test actual mobility.
There is no information on a refugee’s current state of residence. There is a question about whether a refugee
lived in the same state in the previous year, but a large portion (>40%) of the observations are missing.
13Godøy (2017) uses immigrant employment rates instead of unemployment rates because Norway mea-
sures unemployment based on the number of registered jobseekers. Refugees in Norway have little incentive
to register as jobseekers. This is not a concern in the US context because unemployment rates are derived
from randomized sampling of the entire population.
10
affect assimilation outcomes over time. The specification using the national unemployment
rate at date of arrival treatment is:
yit = α + β0k(ue0 × Φk) + δXi + Φc + Φk + γuest + εictsk
The identifying assumption in this specification is that the date of arrival, and by extension
the initial economic conditions a refugee faces, is as good as random conditional on country
of origin. yit can represent a variety of assimilation outcomes. This study focuses primarily
on current employment and log wages, but I also show the effect of initial economic condi-
tions on welfare utilization. The subscript i denotes variation across individuals, t denotes
variation across survey years, c denotes variation across countries of origin, s denotes vari-
ation across states of placement, and k denotes variation across years since moving to the
US (analogous to experience). β0k represents an interaction between the national unem-
ployment rate at the month and year of arrival and k years since the refugee migrated to
the US. This interaction measures how the unemployment rate at arrival affects assimilation
outcomes as the refugee gains experience in the US. The national unemployment variable,
ue0, is the national unemployment for the month and year of arrival for each refugee. The
years since migration fixed effect variable, Φk, divides the number of days since migration
into intervals. The earliest a refugee appears in the Annual Survey of Refugees data is six
months post-arrival. Therefore, a value of 0 for k would represent a refugee who has been
in the US between six months and one year. A value of 5 for k represents a refugee who
has been in the US between five years and 2,175 days, the longest-tenured refugee in the
sample. To allow for full flexibility, I do not make any linearity assumptions regarding the
interaction between years since migration and the initial unemployment rate.
National and state unemployment rates at the time of arrival never change for a refugee,
so it is not possible to measure a scarring effect by comparing an individual across time.
Therefore, I control for individual characteristics to create comparisons between individuals
with similar characteristics. Xi contains a vector of controls that includes years of education
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prior to arrival, gender, age, age2, English ability at arrival, disability status, marital status,
family size, and parental status. Disability status, marital status, family size, and parental
status are asked in the context of the period being surveyed, so I use only the initial answer
given when the refugee first appears in the dataset14. I control for country of origin fixed
effects, Φc, to ensure that only individuals from the same country are being compared to one
another. Given that push factors (where a conflict starts) and pull factors (possible discrim-
ination on who is admitted based on country of origin) determine how many refugees from
a certain country are admitted each year, it is especially important to include this control.
I also control for years since migration fixed effects, Φk, in order to separate pure potential
experience from the interaction of initial economic conditions with experience. Finally, I
control for the contemporaneous state of placement unemployment rate, uest, in order to
account for persistence of economic conditions15. It is expected that poor initial economic
conditions would persist over the next few years as the economy is recovering. By controlling
for the contemporaneous state of placement unemployment rate and years since migration
fixed effects, the effect measured from the interaction between initial unemployment rate
and years since migration fixed effects represents only those effects that are unexplained by
persistence of economic conditions or experience. This measure is the best representation of
“scarring” as consistent with the literature16.
The specification using the state unemployment rate at date of arrival treatment is:
14Given that refugees are not surveyed until at least six months after entry, these controls could still be
endogenous. However, differences between columns 5 and 6 on Appendix Tables A.1-A.4 provide evidence
that these endogeneity concerns do not seem to drive results.
15Ideally I would like to control for the unemployment rate of the state that the refugee is currently
residing. Unfortunately, this information is not available. The contemporaneous state of placement un-
employment rate is a better substitute than the contemporaneous national unemployment rate because it
provides more variation. However, results using the contemporaneous national unemployment rate yield
qualitatively similar (in most cases statistically indistinguishable) results.
16Some papers in the scarring literature also control for contemporaneous year fixed effects. This is likely
a bad control when using the Annual Survey of Refugees data. My treatment, unemployment rate at arrival,
is based on the date of arrival. Date of arrival determines when a refugee is first surveyed and whether they
appear in the survey one to five years later. Therefore, the treatment is highly correlated and deterministic
of the contemporaneous survey year. This is not the case with contemporaneous unemployment rate because
initial economic conditions do a poor job of predicting future economic conditions.
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yit = α + βs0k(ues0 × Φk) + δXi + Φc + Φk + γuest + Φ0 + Φs + εicstk
The identifying assumption in this specification is that the initial economic conditions of
the state a refugee is placed is as good as random, conditional on country of origin, date
of arrival and state of placement. This specification is similar to the specification using the
national unemployment rate with the exception of two additional controls. Date of arrival
fixed effects, Φ0, control for national economic trends at time of arrival. State fixed effects,
Φs, control for general differences between states. With these controls, the interaction be-
tween state unemployment rate at arrival and years since migration should be interpreted
as the effect of initial state labor market conditions deviating from the national average
that is unexplained by the persistence of economic conditions, experience, or idosyncratic
differences between states.
Unfortunately, there is no information in the data about whether a refugee already has family
living in the country, so the estimates using placement-state unemployment at arrival could
be biased upward or downward. Empirical tests outlined in Sections 7.1 and 7.2 suggest
they are likely biased downward. For this reason, I rely solely on results using national un-
employment rate at arrival to provide unbiased estimates of scarring. Nevertheless, I believe
estimates using placement-state unemployment are still informative as this potential bias
would only apply to those individuals who already have family in the country.17
6 Results
6.1 Employment and Wages
Table 2 shows the main results of my analysis. The table is split into two parts. The first
two columns represent estimates found using the national unemployment rate at arrival in-
17Unfortunately, there is no published information on how many of these individuals have family already
living in the country. My discussions with former employees of various VOLAGS suggest it could be as high
as 50% of refugees.
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teracted with years since migration. The third and fourth columns model estimates found
using the state unemployment rate at arrival interacted with years since migration. The
first and third columns model current employment at the time the refugee was surveyed and
should be interpreted as percentage point changes. The second and fourth columns model
log wages18 of employed individuals at the time the refugee was surveyed and should be
interpreted as (approximate) percentage changes. The first row represents individuals who
have been in the United States between six months and one year. The final row represents
individuals who have been in the United States for over five years with the longest-tenured
refugees in the sample having been in the country for 2,175 days.
In Table 2, Column 1, I observe that refugees who have been in the country between four and
five years experience a 3.65 percentage point decrease in current employment for every one
percentage point increase in the national unemployment rate in the month and year of their
arrival. Given that I control for both contemporaneous state of placement unemployment
rate and years since migration, these estimates represent the effect of labor market condi-
tions at arrival that is unexplained by the persistence of economic conditions or experience.
Standard errors are clustered at the month by year level and remain statistically significant
at the 0.1% level until year five. In Appendix Table A.1, I provide detailed information
about the estimates found in Table 2, Column 1. Columns 1-6 in Appendix Table A.1 show
changes to the estimates as covariates are added.
In Table 2, Column 2, I find that after five years in the United States, refugees experience a
3.45% decrease in wages for every one percentage point increase in the national unemploy-
ment rate in the month and year of their arrival. The estimates are still significant after a
refugee has been in the country over five years. This provides evidence that initial national
economic conditions have a long-term persistent effect on wages. Appendix Table A.2 pro-
18The log wage estimates are based only on those individuals who are employed at the time they are
surveyed. This is a classic selection bias issue. In order to verify results, I estimate the effect of initial
economic conditions on hourly wages (with those currently unemployed reporting zero dollars in wages)
using a Poisson QMLE model and find results that have the same sign but are larger in magnitude, as
expected.
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vides detailed information about the estimates found in Table 2, Column 2.
In Table 2, Column 3, I find evidence of a slightly positive relationship between the state
unemployment rate in the month and year of arrival and current employment for refugees
who have been in the country between four and five years. This specification controls for
both national economic trends in the year and month of arrival and state fixed effects, so the
interpretation is that refugees who have been in the country for four to five years experience
a 1.36 percentage point increase in current employment for every one percentage point differ-
ence in the state of arrival unemployment rate from the national unemployment rate. This
could be the result of mobility. As refugees are placed in states with tighter labor market
conditions than neighboring states, they could be incentivized to move and experience better
long term employment outcomes than they would otherwise. Appendix Table A.3 provides
detailed information about the estimates found in Table 2, Column 3.
In Table 2, Column 4, I find that refugees experience a 1-2% decrease in wages for up to
three years after migration for every one percentage point increase in the difference from
the state unemployment rate and the national unemployment rate in the month and year
of arrival. As predicted, the estimates dissipate faster than what I observe using the na-
tional unemployment rate at arrival because refugees are able to move out of states that are
experiencing tighter labor market conditions. However, even with the option of moving to
better labor market conditions, the wages for refugees who experience tighter labor market
conditions at arrival are still lower for up to three years after arrival. Appendix Table A.4
provides detailed information about the estimates found in Table 2, Column 4.
6.2 Welfare Utilization
In Table 3, I show how national and state unemployment rates at arrival affect utilization
of means-tested social welfare programs for refugees. Unlike most immigrants, refugees are
an exempt group that are allowed to participate in means-tested social welfare programs
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during their first five years in the country19. This is an important outcome to investigate
because empirical evidence has shown that increasing access to welfare programs for refugees
can lead to increases in wages (LoPalo 2018). Finding evidence of a positive relationship
between welfare utilization and unemployment at arrival suggests that some of the wage
scarring effects for refugees may have been mitigated. Since non-refugee immigrants are not
allowed to participate in these programs for their first five years post-arrival, this provides
suggestive evidence that the wage scarring effects may be much larger for non-refugee immi-
grant groups.
I look at four different programs: Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) (now
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families [TANF]), General Assistance (GA), Supplemen-
tal Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). AFDC
(now TANF) is cash grant program for families with children20. GA is a state program
that works similarly to AFDC for individuals who do have children21. I group GA with
AFDC/TANF into a single outcome variable that is 1 if either program is used and 0 if
neither program is used. SNAP is a food nutrition program that provides vouchers and/or
debit cards to purchase food22. SSI is a federal income supplement program that provides
cash assistance to aged, blind and disabled people23.
It is important to note that the AFDC/GA, SNAP and SSI variables do not represent
whether or not an individual refugee participated in each of these programs. The Annual
Survey of Refugees questionnaire asks the head of household in each survey period whether
or not someone within the family unit received benefits from each of these programs in the
last 12 months. Therefore, the correct interpretation of the estimates found in Table 3 should
be whether a percentage point increase in the national or state unemployment rate at arrival
19https://aspe.hhs.gov/basic-report/overview-immigrants-eligibility-snap-tanf-medicaid-and-chip
20https://aspe.hhs.gov/aid-families-dependent-children-afdc-and-temporary-assistance-needy-families-
tanf-overview-0
21https://www.cbpp.org/research/family-income-support/state-general-assistance-programs-are-
weakening-despite-increased
22https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap
23https://www.ssa.gov/ssi/
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increased the percentage likelihood that at least one person within one’s family collected one
of these benefits in the past 12 months.
In Table 3, column 1, I find that a one percentage point increase in the national unemploy-
ment rate at arrival increased the likelihood that at least one family member received either
AFDC/TANF or GA in the past year by 2.89% after five years. I find similar results with
SNAP in Table 3, column 2. A one percentage point increase in the national unemployment
at arrival increases the likelihood that at least one family member received SNAP benefits
in the past years by 3.58% up to five years later. Interestingly, I find a negative relation-
ship between arrival national unemployment rate and SSI utilization. A one percentage
point increase in the national unemployment rate at arrival decreases the likelihood that at
least one family member received SSI benefits in the past year by 1.82% up to four years
later. This could be because SSI eligibility is tied to other income streams so an increase in
AFDC/TANF benefits could offset the ability for families to also obtain this benefit24.
Similar to estimates found using the national unemployment rate at arrival, in Table 3,
columns 4 and 5, I find an increase in both AFDC/GA and SNAP utilization within families
as a result of an increase in the state unemployment rate at arrival. However, as found in
the state estimates in Table 2, these effects dissipate within the first two to three years. In
Table 3, column 6, I find that an increase in the state unemployment does have a persistent
negative effect on SSI utilization within families. A one percentage point increase in the
state unemployment rate at arrival decreases the likelihood that at least one family collected
on SSI within the last year by 2.47% after five years.
6.3 Heterogeneity Within Employment and Wage Estimates
In Tables 4 and 5, I split the employment and log wage estimates from the Main Results
table, Table 2, into groups by gender and educational attainment in the origin country. Ed-
24https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v66n4/v66n4p21.html
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ucational attainment is classified as “No High School” for refugees with no secondary school,
college diploma or medical school diploma from their country of origin. I classify refugees
who report having completed secondary school but not college or medical school in their
country of origin as “High School.” Lastly, I classify refugees who completed college and/or
medical school in their country of origin as “College.”
In Table 4, I examine heterogeneity across employment estimates found in Table 2. Using
the national unemployment rate at arrival as the treatment, I observe that college-educated
males experience less persistence in employment scarring than non-high-school-educated and
high-school-educated males. College-educated males experience a 2.82 percentage point de-
crease in employment up to 3 years later while non-high-school-educated males experience
a 5.58 percentage point decrease up to 4 years later. High-school-educated males experi-
ence a 4.72 percentage point decrease in employment up to 5 years later. For females, the
effect is persistent across all education groups and larger in magnitude for college-educated-
females than estimates found for non-high-school-educated females and high-school-educated
females. For every percentage point increase in the national unemployment rate at arrival,
college-educated females experience a 9.59 percentage point reduction in employment after
five years. High-school-educated females experience a 6.09 percentage point reduction in em-
ployment after five years and non-high-school educated females experience a 4.79 percentage
point reduction in employment up to five years. Estimates using the state unemployment
rate as treatment show no statistically significant estimates of employment scarring across
groups. However, the positive relationship between state unemployment rate at arrival and
employment outcomes found in Table 2 between the fourth and fifth year seem to be driven
entirely by college-educated males. When I isolate the sample to only this group, I observe
a 4.79 percentage point increase in employment after 4 years. However, this is the only time
period that I observe a statistically significant effect.
In Table 5, I examine heterogeneity across wage estimates found in Table 2. Again I find
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a less persistent effect for college-educated males using the national unemployment rate
at arrival as treatment, but the magnitudes are similar to those found in non-high-school-
educated males and high-school-educated males. The effect is the most persistent and largest
in magnitude for high-school-educated males. For every one percentage point increase in
the national unemployment rate at arrival, high-school-educated males experience a 5.67%
decrease in wages after five years. For females, I find similar results in magnitude and per-
sistence for non-high-school-educated females and high-school-educated females. I do not
observe statistically significant results for college-educated-females but the magnitudes are
similar to those found in the other age groups suggesting that the results might be similar
but I lack statistical power for this group. Using the state unemployment rate at arrival
as treatment, I only observe statistically significant estimates of wage scarring for high-
school-educated males. However, the magnitudes in estimates for college-educated-males
and college-educated-females are larger but lack of statistical power to assess whether these
estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero.
7 Threats to Internal Validity
7.1 Treatment Endogeneity
One way my estimates could be biased is if there is endogenous sorting of refugees either in
timing of their arrival or in the states where they are placed. The national unemployment
rate at arrival depends on the assumption that the number of refugees coming to the US
is not systematically related to national economic conditions. In order to test the validity
of this assumption, I use fiscal year refugee arrival totals found in Zong J. et. al (2017) for
the 1980-2015 time period. These data cover the entire period of the refugee resettlement
program. I compare these data to annual new immigrant arrival totals calculated using
IPUMS American Community Survey data (Ruggles et. al 2017) for the 1980-2015 time
period. I convert both sets of totals to logs to ease interpretation (immigrant totals are in
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millions while refugee totals are in tens of thousands) and plot them across average national
unemployment rates for the time periods that the totals were reported. In Figure 2, we can
see that while total immigration is systematically related to national economic conditions,
refugee immigration is not. Total immigration decreases at a statistically significant rate
of 9.85% for every one percentage point increase in the national unemployment rate, while
refugee totals show a statistically insignificant increase of 3.46% with a standard error of
3.10%.
The placement-state unemployment rate at arrival treatment relies on stronger assumptions.
For this treatment to be exogenous, refugee arrivals must also not be systematically related
the economic conditions of the state where they are placed. In Table 6, I provide a test of
exogeneity in the state placement process. The Refugee Processing Center collects monthly
data on refugee arrivals by state and country of origin25. Unfortunately, data are only
available after 2002 so I am only able to look at the 2002-2016 period. I run three separate
regressions in order to look at the level difference of refugee placement on state unemployment
rate changes, the percentage difference and the percentage difference accounting for state-
month pairs where no refugees were placed. In columns 1, 3, and 5 of Table 2, I regress
monthly placement totals on the monthly state unemployment rate controlling for individual
state fixed effects. These estimates represent the changes in refugee placement as the state
unemployment rate increases. Using a Poisson QMLE model to account for state-month
pairs where no refugees were placed, I find a slightly positive response of 3.22% in refugee
placements as the state unemployment rate rises one percentage point. In columns 2, 4,
and 6 of Table 2, I also control for year by month fixed effects. These estimates represent
the changes in refugee placement in response to deviations from the national unemployment
rate. Therefore, the estimates found in columns 2, 4, and 6 more accurately characterize
whether refugee placements are systematically related to states with better or worse economic
conditions. In column 6, I find a negative response of 3.27% as the state unemployment rises
25These data are provided through an online portal called WRAPSNet, http://ireports.wrapsnet.org
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one percentage point above the national unemployment rate. However, in terms of levels, I
find in column 2 that this change constitutes a statistically insignificant response of 1.714
less refugees from a baseline of 97.39. Nevertheless, the evidence for exogeneity in state
placement is less certain so I rely more on my estimates using the national unemployment
at arrival to provide an unbiased estimate of employment and wage scarring for refugees.
7.2 Non-Random Sorting
In Section 2, I outline how volunteer agencies (VOLAGS) make every effort to place refugees
who have family already living in the country near or with them. This presents a potential
problem of non-random sorting. Unfortunately, I do not have information in my data on
whether a refugee has family already living in the country or how many refugees are being
placed with families. Therefore, the model using the state unemployment rate at arrival
treatment could be biased downward or upward. If more refugees are being placed with
family members in states with worse initial economic conditions, it may appear that the
state of placement is responsible for better assimilation outcomes when it is actually the
added benefits of having family already living in the country. Conversely, if more refugees
are being placed with family members in states with better initial economic conditions, the
added benefit of having family already living in the country could increase the differences
found in good states and bad states. This potential for bias does not exist for the specification
using the national unemployment rate because familial ties do not determine when a refugee
will arrive. All refugees must still undertake a 18-24 month screening process prior to arrival.
In order to assess how this potential problem of non-random sorting might affect my estimates
I turn to another dataset on refugees. In Beaman (2012), the primary dataset used in her
analysis are administrative records from the International Rescue Committee (IRC), one
of the VOLAGs mentioned in Section 2. These data comprise over 1700 males who arrive
between 2001 and 2005. Given that there is information on whether a refugee is placed
with or near their family, the sample is limited to those individuals who do not have any
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familial ties prior to arrival. Unfortunately, the data only measure outcomes after ninety
days and arrival dates are only reported in years. Therefore I can not estimate employment
or wage scarring using these data. However, I can use these data to assess how initial
economic conditions might affect initial employment and wage outcomes in the absence of
family placement.
I use the following regression for columns 1 and 2 in Table 8: yi = α+βue0+δXi+Φc+εict. In
this regression, I look at the effect of the national unemployment rate at arrival (as measured
by the annual average in the year of arrival) on employment and wage outcomes 90 days
post-arrival. I control for country of origin fixed effects, Φc, and a vector of covariates, Xi.
Covariates include age, age2, disability, english ability, years of education, marital status and
family size. For Table 8, columns 3 and 4, I use the following regression: yi = α + βues0 +
δXi +Φc +Φ0 +Φs + εicst. This regression is the same as the regression used in the first two
columns with the exception of added controls for year of arrival fixed effects, Φ0, and state
of placement fixed effects, Φs.
In Table 8, I find that initial national and state economic conditions do have a substantial
impact on both initial employment and log wage outcomes. The estimates are also larger
in magnitude than initial six months to one year estimates found Table 2, but these effects
are also measured much earlier. The main point of this exercise is to assess the effect on
employment and log wage outcomes using the state unemployment at arrival treatment
in the absence of family placement. For every one percentage point increase in the state
unemployment rate from the national unemployment rate, I find a very large negative effect
of 12.4 percentage points on initial employment and large negative effect of 4.33% on initial
log wages. This result suggests that either the negative effect of a high state unemployment
at arrival dissipates very quickly or my results found in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 might be
biased downward from non-random placement near family for some refugees in my dataset.
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7.3 Sample Selection
In Figure 1 and Table 6, I test whether the total refugee arriving population is systematically
related to national and state economic conditions, respectively. However, given that I am
working with only a sample of these refugees, I also need to assess whether the national
unemployment at arrival and state unemployment at arrival treatments are systematically
related to any of my covariates. It is understood that country of origin will be systematically
related to the timing of arrival for refugees because of both push and pull factors. Push fac-
tors, including the break out of conflict in a particular country at a particular time, partially
determine how many refugees from a particular country are applying to the UNHCR and US
Refugee Resettlement program. Pull factors, including differential arrival quotas of refugees
by region26, partially determine how many refugees from a particular country are allowed to
enter the US at a particular time. Luckily, I have information on country of origin for each
refugee in my data so I am able to control for this.
In Table 7, I test whether any other covariates might be systematically related to the na-
tional unemployment rate at arrival or state unemployment rate at arrival treatments after
controlling for country of origin. For Table 7, column 1, I use the following specification,
ue0 = α+ δXi +Φc +εict. This regression tests whether any of the covariates, Xi, are related
to the national unemployment rate at arrival after controlling for country of origin fixed ef-
fects, Φc. In the second column, I use the specification, ues0 = α+δXi+Φc+Φ0+εict. In this
regression, I test whether any of the covariates, Xi, are related to state unemployment rate
at arrival controlling for country of origin fixed effects, Φc, and year by month of arrival fixed
effects, Φ0. Year by month of arrival fixed effects are used to demean state unemployment
rates from the national unemployment rate so I can test whether covariates are related to
states with better or worse economic conditions. In Table 7, column 1, I find that years of
education and gender are both positively related to the national unemployment rate at ar-
rival. This suggests that, within my sample, those arriving to the US under worse economic
26https://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/docsforcongress/261956.htm
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conditions are slightly more educated and female. It’s unclear whether these differences bias
my estimates as more education is related to better labor outcomes while being female may
be linked to worse labor outcomes. In Table 7, column 2, I find that marriage is positively
related to the state unemployment rate at arrival. This means that states with worse eco-
nomic conditions than the rest of the country are receiving more married individuals. This
could potentially bias my state estimates downward as marriage may be linked to better
labor outcomes and those individuals are being placed in states with worse initial economic
conditions. Overall, however, the sample appears to be fairly balanced after controlling for
country of origin.
7.4 Attrition
Another potential concern is attrition bias. Fewer than 10% of individual refugees in the
sample are surveyed all five years. One problem is that the Annual Survey of Refugees targets
families, not individuals, so there are some individuals who appear in the data in some years
and not in others, even though the family itself may be included in all five years. This could
bias estimates upwards if individuals are more likely to participate in the survey if they
are unemployed. If refugees are more likely to be employed under better initial economic
conditions, and those who are employed are less likely to participate in the survey, then
comparisons between similar refugees entering the US under different economic conditions
would reflect differences predominantly between the unemployed individuals of each group.
Attrition may also occur in the data because families move and thus become harder to find
for subsequent surveys. If individuals who have a harder time finding a job are more likely
to move, then this could bias results downwards. It may be the case that refugees who
immigrate to the US under poorer economic conditions are more likely to move in their
first few years and achieve better assimilation outcomes as a result. However, given that
these individuals are less likely to participate in the survey given that they have moved, my
estimates would reflect differences among refugees who enter the US under better economic
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conditions and only those refugees who could not afford to move would be reflected in the
group who entered the US under worse economic conditions.
In order to test if attrition is problematic for my results, I first regress current employment
and log wages on fixed characteristics of the individuals: gender, age, age2, disability status
at arrival, English at arrival, years of education at arrival, marital status at arrival, family
size at arrival, whether or not an individual has children at arrival. I then take the predicted
values of this regression and plug them into my original specifications. For example, I
take the predicted values of current employment on covariates and regress those predicted
values on an interaction between the national unemployment rate at month and year of
arrival and years since migration, controlling for country of origin, years since migration,
and contemporaneous placement-state unemployment rate. If the interaction between the
national unemployment rate at the month and year of arrival and years since migration show
any significant effects on the predicted values, I would be concerned that characteristics of
individuals in later years are changing and that attrition may be driving my results.
Table 9 shows the results of this analysis. Using the state unemployment rate specification,
the results are all statistically indistinguishable from zero with the exception of a marginally
significant but small estimate for employment in the first 6 months to 1 year of arrival.
This provides evidence that there are no changes in the characteristics of individuals over
different years in the interaction between the state unemployment rate at the year and month
of arrival and years since migration. Thus, attrition is likely not driving the results for the
state unemployment rate specification for either the employment or log wage outcomes.
Using the national unemployment rate specification, there is some evidence of changes in
characteristics of the individuals for those refugees who have been in the US between six
months to one year and those who have been in the US for 1 to 2 years for employment
estimates. However, there is no evidence that the employment results found in later years
is driven by changes in the general makeup of individuals. For log wage estimates using the
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national unemployment rate treatment, I find only small statistically significant differences
in 6 months to one year and 2 to 3 years estimates. Given that overall, the national and
state unemployment specifications in Table 9 do not predict the outcomes from the main
specifications, I am confident that attrition is not driving my results.
8 Conclusion
In this study, I find evidence of both wage and employment scarring among refugees who
migrate to the US. On average, refugees experience a 3.45% decrease in wages after five years
and a 3.65 percentage point decrease in employment after four years for every one percentage
point increase in the national unemployment rate at arrival. Attempts were also made
to understand how across-region mobility might mitigate these effects. Using placement-
state unemployment rate at arrival, I find no evidence of employment scarring effect and
a less persistent wage scarring effect. However, empirical tests show that estimates using
the state of placement unemployment rate may be biased downward due to an unknown
number of refugees being placed near their families. Therefore, I rely only on the national
unemployment rate of arrival treatment to provide unbiased estimates of employment and
wage scarring for refugees.
I also find evidence that initial economic conditions have a long-term effect on utilization
of means-tested welfare programs. For every one percentage point increase in the national
unemployment rate at arrival, I observe a 2.89% increased likelihood that at least one member
of a refugee’s family is collecting AFDC/TANF or GA benefits after five years. I also observe
a 3.58% increased likelihood that at least one member of their family is collecting SNAP
benefits up after four years. Empirical evidence from LoPalo (2018) suggests that increased
access to these programs increases wages for refugees, so it is possible that these wage scarring
effects have been somewhat mitigated. If so, wage scarring for non-refugee immigrants could
be larger in magnitude as these groups are barred from accessing such programs.
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Figures
Figure 1: Resettlement Sites by Volunteer Agency27
27Source: https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/fy2014-reception-and-placement-rp-network
-affiliates-map
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Figure 2: Log New Arrivals by National Unemployment Rate (1980-2015)28
Note: Standard errors are clustered at year of arrival level.
28Log new arrival totals for all immigrants are based on author estimates using IPUMS American Com-
munity Survey data for 2011-2016 (Ruggles et. al 2017). Log new arrival totals for refugees are based on
reported estimates from the Migration Policy Institute (Zong J. et. al 2017). The average national unem-
ployment rate is the average for the calendar year for the immigrant estimates as those totals are reported
in calendar years. The average national unemployment rate is the average for the fiscal year (October of
the previous year to September of the current year) for the refugee estimates as those totals are reported in
fiscal years.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics by Year of Arrival
Demographics 1988-1991 1992-1995 1996-1999 2000-2004 All Years
Years Of Education 10.25 10.42 10.74 9.94 10.36
% Female 50.63 51.34 49.74 43.46 49.45
Age at Arrival 31.51 32.98 32.13 30.49 32.11
% Fluent in English 9.21 7.47 10.68 20.18 10.35
% Disabled 10.70 13.21 8.35 8.84 11.11
% Married 61.26 54.40 58.40 49.17 55.29
Family Size 4.98 5.00 4.62 4.97 4.93
% Have Children 55.01 56.49 61.24 57.52 57.20
% from Africa 1.62 5.14 10.21 31.15 10.32
% from Asia 86.42 79.06 43.39 38.34 66.71
% from Europe 11.96 15.78 45.79 29.45 22.66
% from S. America 0 0 0.62 1.06 0.31
Individuals 3336 8712 3086 3576 18710
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Table 2: Main Results
National Unemployment Rate
(1) (2)
Employment Log Wages
6 mos to 1 year, ue0 -0.0129 -0.0171+
(0.0115) (0.0095)
1 to 2 years, ue0 -0.0452*** -0.0314***
(0.0070) (0.0058)
2 to 3 years, ue0 -0.0553*** -0.0397***
(0.0066) (0.0055)
3 to 4 years, ue0 -0.0488*** -0.0251*
(0.0106) (0.0097)
4 to 5 years, ue0 -0.0365*** -0.0437***
(0.0100) (0.0079)
Over 5 years, ue0 -0.0201 -0.0345***
(0.0168) (0.0090)
Observations 32278 14100
Adj. R2 0.265 0.255
+ 0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001
State Unemployment Rate
(3) (4)
Employment Log Wages
0.0084 -0.0117+
(0.0109) (0.0069)
-0.0056 -0.0164*
(0.0076) (0.0064)
-0.0024 -0.0136+
(0.0071) (0.0069)
0.0074 -0.0067
(0.0070) (0.0068)
0.0136* -0.0092
(0.0065) (0.0065)
0.0101 -0.0018
(0.0095) (0.0066)
32278 14100
0.289 0.285
Note: Standard errors are clustered at month by year of arrival level for national unemploy-
ment rate estimates. Standard errors are clustered at state of arrival by month by year of
arrival level for state unemployment rate estimates.
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Table 3: Estimates on Welfare Utilization
National Unemployment Rate
(1) (2) (3)
AFDC/GA SNAP SSI
1 to 2 years, ue0 -0.0292* 0.0392** -0.0148
(0.0135) (0.0119) (0.0109)
2 to 3 years, ue0 0.0363*** 0.0659*** 0.0029
(0.0095) (0.0131) (0.0087)
3 to 4 years, ue0 0.0315** 0.0380** -0.0182*
(0.0104) (0.0114) (0.0071)
4 to 5 years, ue0 0.0515*** 0.0358** 0.0082
(0.0087) (0.0114) (0.0101)
Over 5 years, ue0 0.0289** -0.0107 -0.0197
(0.0106) (0.0147) (0.0133)
Observations 32123 32226 32217
Adj. R2 0.225 0.285 0.151
+ 0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001
State Unemployment Rate
(4) (5) (6)
AFDC/GA SNAP SSI
0.0025 -0.0038 -0.0347***
(0.0115) (0.0103) (0.0086)
0.0248* 0.0181+ -0.0228*
(0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0095)
0.0142 0.0062 -0.0237**
(0.0102) (0.0104) (0.0084)
0.0142 0.0053 -0.0088
(0.0098) (0.0104) (0.0084)
0.0024 -0.0094 -0.0247*
(0.0114) (0.0147) (0.0100)
32123 32226 32217
0.277 0.322 0.182
Note: Standard errors are clustered at month by year of arrival level for national unemployment rate estimates. Standard errors
are clustered at state of arrival by month by year of arrival level for state unemployment rate estimates.
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Table 4: Heterogeneity within Employment Estimates
National Unemployment Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No HS HS College No HS HS College
Males Males Males Females Females Females
6 mos to 1 year, ue0 -0.0168 -0.0414+ -0.0546 0.0185 0.0197 -0.0755*
(0.0221) (0.0223) (0.0354) (0.0267) (0.0164) (0.0347)
1 to 2 years, ue0 -0.0564** -0.0537*** -0.0543** -0.0172 -0.0420** -0.0528*
(0.0159) (0.0121) (0.0174) (0.0133) (0.0141) (0.0245)
2 to 3 years, ue0 -0.0576*** -0.0653*** -0.0282+ -0.0648*** -0.0441*** -0.0244
(0.0151) (0.0116) (0.0152) (0.0151) (0.0089) (0.0240)
3 to 4 years, ue0 -0.0558** -0.0562*** -0.0158 -0.0607*** -0.0563** -0.0380
(0.0178) (0.0104) (0.0212) (0.0166) (0.0164) (0.0266)
4 to 5 years, ue0 0.0057 -0.0472*** -0.0015 -0.0479* -0.0556** -0.0717**
(0.0208) (0.0113) (0.0206) (0.0187) (0.0173) (0.0225)
Over 5 years, ue0 -0.0014 -0.0112 0.0020 0.0087 -0.0609*** -0.0959***
(0.0285) (0.0255) (0.0233) (0.0336) (0.0170) (0.0265)
Observations 4532 8522 2718 5561 7687 2473
Adj. R2 0.290 0.233 0.299 0.236 0.235 0.278
State Unemployment Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No HS HS College No HS HS College
Males Males Males Females Females Females
6 mos to 1 year, ue0 0.0064 -0.0150 -0.0160 0.0228 0.0184 -0.0423
(0.0174) (0.0186) (0.0296) (0.0151) (0.0177) (0.0261)
1 to 2 years, ue0 -0.0012 -0.0128 -0.0222 0.0097 -0.0180 -0.0256
(0.0139) (0.0147) (0.0201) (0.0132) (0.0126) (0.0247)
2 to 3 years, ue0 -0.0102 -0.0057 0.0126 -0.0018 -0.0082 -0.0209
(0.0141) (0.0148) (0.0156) (0.0131) (0.0136) (0.0227)
3 to 4 years, ue0 -0.0160 0.0080 0.0173 -0.0026 0.0081 -0.0250
(0.0117) (0.0123) (0.0164) (0.0138) (0.0136) (0.0230)
4 to 5 years, ue0 0.0039 0.0078 0.0479** -0.0035 0.0060 -0.0122
(0.0129) (0.0120) (0.0171) (0.0131) (0.0126) (0.0233)
Over 5 years, ue0 -0.0151 0.0086 0.0130 0.0108 -0.0031 -0.0205
(0.0165) (0.0133) (0.0175) (0.0150) (0.0161) (0.0263)
Observations 4532 8522 2718 5561 7687 2473
Adj. R2 0.333 0.266 0.353 0.284 0.264 0.324
+ 0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001
Note: Standard errors are clustered at month and year of arrival level for national unemployment rate
estimates. Standard errors are clustered at state of arrival by month and year of arrival level for state
unemployment rate estimates.
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Table 5: Heterogeneity within Log Wage Estimates
National Unemployment Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No HS HS College No HS HS College
Males Males Males Females Females Females
6 mos to 1 year, ue0 -0.0407** -0.0200 -0.0176 -0.0247 -0.0019 -0.0597
(0.0123) (0.0225) (0.0360) (0.0184) (0.0204) (0.0520)
1 to 2 years, ue0 -0.0448*** -0.0313** -0.0433* -0.0318** -0.0300** -0.0160
(0.0105) (0.0091) (0.0160) (0.0104) (0.0107) (0.0205)
2 to 3 years, ue0 -0.0278* -0.0510*** -0.0445+ -0.0705*** -0.0360*** -0.0419
(0.0108) (0.0071) (0.0247) (0.0110) (0.0090) (0.0249)
3 to 4 years, ue0 -0.0303+ -0.0146 -0.0448+ -0.0550** -0.0390*** -0.0114
(0.0172) (0.0109) (0.0254) (0.0188) (0.0105) (0.0260)
4 to 5 years, ue0 -0.0333* -0.0650*** -0.0158 -0.0573** -0.0292* -0.0558
(0.0133) (0.0102) (0.0244) (0.0168) (0.0125) (0.0358)
Over 5 years, ue0 -0.0282 -0.0567*** 0.0085 -0.0335* -0.0469** 0.0190
(0.0255) (0.0113) (0.0318) (0.0149) (0.0148) (0.0519)
Observations 1825 4578 1266 1813 3399 922
Adj. R2 0.173 0.223 0.266 0.251 0.164 0.199
State Unemployment Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No HS HS College No HS HS College
Males Males Males Females Females Females
6 mos to 1 year, ue0 0.0028 -0.0138 -0.0362 0.0083 -0.0062 -0.0449
(0.0177) (0.0111) (0.0403) (0.0138) (0.0127) (0.0606)
1 to 2 years, ue0 -0.0184 -0.0252* -0.0392 0.0113 -0.0162 -0.0266
(0.0164) (0.0108) (0.0323) (0.0137) (0.0122) (0.0359)
2 to 3 years, ue0 -0.0035 -0.0233* -0.0357 -0.0013 -0.0103 -0.0251
(0.0168) (0.0101) (0.0306) (0.0144) (0.0131) (0.0349)
3 to 4 years, ue0 0.0001 -0.0117 -0.0532 0.0163 -0.0025 -0.0270
(0.0152) (0.0099) (0.0334) (0.0141) (0.0094) (0.0335)
4 to 5 years, ue0 -0.0015 -0.0186+ -0.0486 0.0137 0.0021 -0.0329
(0.0152) (0.0100) (0.0323) (0.0131) (0.0097) (0.0313)
Over 5 years, ue0 0.0047 -0.0147 -0.0270 0.0167 -0.0013 0.0282
(0.0156) (0.0105) (0.0353) (0.0137) (0.0108) (0.0396)
Observations 1825 4578 1266 1813 3399 922
Adj. R2 0.264 0.277 0.309 0.330 0.216 0.293
+ 0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001
Note: Standard errors are clustered at month and year of arrival level for national unemployment rate
estimates. Standard errors are clustered at state of arrival by month and year of arrival level for state
unemployment rate estimates.
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Table 6: Refugee Placements by State Unemployment Rate (2002-2016)29
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Refugee Refugee Log Refugee Log Refugee Refugee Refugee
Placements Placements Placements Placements Placements Placements
State Unemployment Rate 3.937*** -1.714 0.0590*** -0.0582*** 0.0322*** -0.0327**
(0.715) (1.232) (0.00592) (0.0125) (0.00575) (0.0108)
State FE * * * * * *
Year by Month FE * * *
Model OLS OLS Poisson QMLE
Baseline 97.39 97.39 3.92 3.92 97.39 97.39
Observations 9180 9180 7908 7908 9180 9180
Adj. R2 0.638 0.725 0.716 0.838
Pseudo R2 0.746 0.871
+ 0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001
Note: Standard errors are clustered at state by month by year level.
29Monthly Refugee Placement data comes from the Refugee Processing Center WRAPSNet website. http://ireports.wrapsnet.org
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Table 7: Test of Balance for Continuous Treatments
(1) (2)
National State
Unemp. Rate Unemp. Rate
Age -0.0005 -0.0010
(0.0015) (0.0013)
English Fluency 0.0037 -0.0010
(0.0467) (0.0476)
Years Of Education 0.0075* 0.0005
(0.0036) (0.0048)
Gender 0.0286* 0.0019
(0.0112) (0.0159)
Disability 0.0351 0.0422
(0.0377) (0.0468)
Married -0.0057 0.0670+
(0.0335) (0.0356)
Family Size 0.0110 -0.0059
(0.0088) (0.0098)
Any Children 0.0116 0.0081
(0.0271) (0.0460)
Observations 15780 15780
Adj. R2 0.257 0.543
+ 0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001
Note: Sample is restricted to first observation of each refugee in the data. Standard errors
are clustered at month by year of arrival level for national unemployment rate estimates.
Standard errors are clustered at state of arrival by month by year of arrival level for state
unemployment rate estimates.
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Table 8: Estimates On Employment and Log Wages using IRC Data30
National Unemployment Rate
(1) (2)
Employment Log Wages
Unemp. Rate at Arrival -0.0619* -0.0210+
(0.0252) (0.0112)
Observations 1606 1033
Adj. R2 0.116 0.075
+ 0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001
State Unemployment Rate
(3) (4)
Employment Log Wages
-0.124** -0.0433*
(0.0439) (0.0185)
1606 1033
0.180 0.237
Note: Standard errors are heteroskedastic robust.
30The International Rescue Committee refugee data used in Beaman 2012 come
from supplemental data provided on the Review of Economic Studies website,
https://academic.oup.com/restud/article/79/1/128/1562775#supplementary-data.
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Table 9: Test for Attrition Bias
National Unemployment Rate
(1) (2)
Predicted Predicted
Employment Log Wages
6 mos to 1 year, ue0 -0.0308*** -0.0062*
(0.0043) (0.0030)
1 to 2 years, ue0 -0.0115** 0.0017
(0.0038) (0.0021)
2 to 3 years, ue0 -0.0054 0.0034+
(0.0039) (0.0019)
3 to 4 years, ue0 -0.0026 0.0025
(0.0039) (0.0022)
4 to 5 years, ue0 -0.0006 0.0016
(0.0044) (0.0024)
Over 5 years, ue0 0.0097 0.0046
(0.0075) (0.0031)
Observations 32438 32438
Adj. R2 0.058 0.178
+ 0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001
State Unemployment Rate
(3) (4)
Predicted Predicted
Employment Log Wages
-0.0073+ -0.0020
(0.0043) (0.0024)
-0.0042 -0.0008
(0.0038) (0.0022)
-0.0013 -0.0011
(0.0036) (0.0024)
-0.0006 -0.0006
(0.0041) (0.0025)
-0.0014 -0.0009
(0.0038) (0.0025)
0.0005 0.0011
(0.0045) (0.0027)
32438 32438
0.079 0.205
Note: Standard errors are clustered at month by year of arrival level for national unemploy-
ment rate estimates. Standard errors are clustered at state of arrival by month by year of
arrival level for state unemployment rate estimates.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Employment Estimates - National Unemployment Rate Treatment
(Robustness Table for Results Found in Table 2, Column 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
6 mos to 1 year, ue0 -0.0391** -0.0298* -0.0297* -0.0262* -0.0261* -0.0129
(0.0116) (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0121) (0.0124) (0.0115)
1 to 2 years, ue0 -0.0532*** -0.0526*** -0.0523*** -0.0503*** -0.0503*** -0.0452***
(0.0065) (0.0069) (0.0070) (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0070)
2 to 3 years, ue0 -0.0581*** -0.0577*** -0.0571*** -0.0563*** -0.0567*** -0.0553***
(0.0083) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0071) (0.0068) (0.0066)
3 to 4 years, ue0 -0.0493*** -0.0538*** -0.0536*** -0.0525*** -0.0517*** -0.0488***
(0.0116) (0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0118) (0.0116) (0.0106)
4 to 5 years, ue0 -0.0359** -0.0446*** -0.0432*** -0.0372** -0.0363** -0.0365***
(0.0123) (0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0100)
Over 5 years, ue0 -0.0099 -0.0232 -0.0233 -0.0192 -0.0184 -0.0201
(0.0170) (0.0155) (0.0153) (0.0165) (0.0163) (0.0168)
Country of Origin * * * * * *
Years Of Education * * * * *
Gender * * * *
Age/Age2 * * *
English At Arrival * *
Other Covariates *
Years Since Migration FE * * * * * *
Contemp. State Unemp Rate -0.0565*** -0.0553*** -0.0557*** -0.0584*** -0.0588*** -0.0580***
(0.0041) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0041)
Observations 32278 32278 32278 32278 32278 32278
Adj. R2 0.110 0.156 0.166 0.242 0.244 0.265
+ 0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001
Note: Standard errors are clustered at month and year of arrival level for national unemployment rate estimates.
Standard errors are clustered at state of arrival by month and year of arrival level for state unemployment rate
estimates.
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Table A.2: Log Wage Estimates - National Unemployment Rate Treatment
(Robustness Table for Results Found in Table 2, Column 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
6 mos to 1 year, ue0 -0.0305** -0.0263** -0.0246** -0.0225* -0.0216* -0.0171+
(0.0089) (0.0092) (0.0089) (0.0091) (0.0092) (0.0095)
1 to 2 years, ue0 -0.0317*** -0.0358*** -0.0351*** -0.0339*** -0.0341*** -0.0314***
(0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0059) (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0058)
2 to 3 years, ue0 -0.0351*** -0.0415*** -0.0406*** -0.0406*** -0.0409*** -0.0397***
(0.0065) (0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0056) (0.0055)
3 to 4 years, ue0 -0.0224* -0.0275** -0.0280** -0.0276** -0.0268** -0.0251*
(0.0100) (0.0093) (0.0092) (0.0094) (0.0096) (0.0097)
4 to 5 years, ue0 -0.0416*** -0.0445*** -0.0452*** -0.0441*** -0.0438*** -0.0437***
(0.0083) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0081) (0.0079) (0.0079)
Over 5 years, ue0 -0.0252* -0.0320** -0.0335** -0.0326** -0.0323** -0.0345***
(0.0108) (0.0098) (0.0099) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0090)
Country of Origin * * * * * *
Years Of Education * * * * *
Gender * * * *
Age/Age2 * * *
English At Arrival * *
Other Covariates *
Years Since Migration FE * * * * * *
Contemp. State Unemp Rate -0.0208*** -0.0213*** -0.0227*** -0.0234*** -0.0239*** -0.0240***
(0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0040)
Observations 14100 14100 14100 14100 14100 14100
Adj. R2 0.167 0.209 0.230 0.247 0.251 0.255
+ 0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001
Note: Standard errors are clustered at month and year of arrival level for national unemployment rate estimates.
Standard errors are clustered at state of arrival by month and year of arrival level for state unemployment rate
estimates.
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Table A.3: Employment Estimates - State Unemployment Rate Treatment
(Robustness Table for Results Found in Table 2, Column 3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
6 mos to 1 year, ue0 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0079 0.0079 0.0085
(0.0121) (0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0109)
1 to 2 years, ue0 -0.0092 -0.0108 -0.0106 -0.0043 -0.0042 -0.0056
(0.0092) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0076)
2 to 3 years, ue0 -0.0040 -0.0062 -0.0060 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0024
(0.0085) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0071)
3 to 4 years, ue0 0.0065 0.0024 0.0024 0.0092 0.0094 0.0074
(0.0087) (0.0080) (0.0079) (0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0070)
4 to 5 years, ue0 0.0120 0.0077 0.0082 0.0160* 0.0164* 0.0136*
(0.0080) (0.0075) (0.0074) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0065)
Over 5 years, ue0 0.0107 0.0063 0.0065 0.0131 0.0129 0.0101
(0.0116) (0.0113) (0.0111) (0.0100) (0.0101) (0.0095)
Country of Origin * * * * * *
Years Of Education * * * * *
Gender * * * *
Age/Age2 * * *
English At Arrival * *
Other Covariates *
Years Since Migration FE * * * * * *
Year by Month of Arrival FE * * * * * *
State of Placement FE * * * * * *
Contemp. State Unemp Rate -0.0337*** -0.0330*** -0.0330*** -0.0331*** -0.0332*** -0.0318***
(0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0057)
Observations 32278 32278 32278 32278 32278 32278
Adj. R2 0.137 0.181 0.190 0.267 0.268 0.289
+ 0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001
Note: Standard errors are clustered at month and year of arrival level for national unemployment rate estimates.
Standard errors are clustered at state of arrival by month and year of arrival level for state unemployment rate
estimates.
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Table A.4: Log Wage Estimates - State Unemployment Rate Treatment
(Robustness Table for Results Found in Table 2, Column 4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
6 mos to 1 year, ue0 -0.0118 -0.0123+ -0.0120+ -0.0110 -0.0109 -0.0117+
(0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0070) (0.0069) (0.0068) (0.0069)
1 to 2 years, ue0 -0.0152* -0.0172* -0.0176** -0.0166* -0.0166* -0.0164*
(0.0068) (0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0064)
2 to 3 years, ue0 -0.0129+ -0.0143* -0.0144* -0.0138+ -0.0137+ -0.0136+
(0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0069) (0.0070) (0.0069) (0.0069)
3 to 4 years, ue0 -0.0062 -0.0084 -0.0082 -0.0074 -0.0071 -0.0067
(0.0070) (0.0069) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0068)
4 to 5 years, ue0 -0.0098 -0.0111+ -0.0110+ -0.0093 -0.0090 -0.0092
(0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0065)
Over 5 years, ue0 -0.0009 -0.0033 -0.0027 -0.0007 -0.0010 -0.0018
(0.0071) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0066)
Country of Origin * * * * * *
Years Of Education * * * * *
Gender * * * *
Age/Age2 * * *
English At Arrival * *
Other Covariates *
Years Since Migration FE * * * * * *
Year by Month of Arrival FE * * * * * *
State of Placement FE * * * * * *
Contemp. State Unemp Rate -0.0264*** -0.0265*** -0.0264*** -0.0252*** -0.0254*** -0.0240***
(0.0052) (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050)
Observations 14100 14100 14100 14100 14100 14100
Adj. R2 0.202 0.241 0.262 0.278 0.282 0.285
+ 0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001
Note: Standard errors are clustered at month and year of arrival level for national unemployment rate estimates.
Standard errors are clustered at state of arrival by month and year of arrival level for state unemployment rate
estimates.
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